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It is intuitively attractive to think that it makes a difference in Newcomb’s problem 
whether or not the predictor is infallible, in the sense of being certainly actually correct. 
This paper argues that that view (A) is irrational and (B) manifests a well-documented 
cognitive illusion. 
 
1. Newcomb’s problem. ‘Suppose a being in whose power to predict your choices 
you have enormous confidence. (One might tell a story about a being from 
another planet, with advanced technology and science, who you know to be 
friendly, etc.) You know that this being has often correctly predicted your choices 
in the past (and has never, so far as you know, made an incorrect prediction 
about your choices), and furthermore you know that this being has often correctly 
predicted the choices of other people, many of whom are similar to you, in the 
particular situation to be described below. One might tell a longer story, but all of 
this leads you to believe that almost certainly this being’s prediction about your 
choice in the situation to be discussed will be correct.’1 
 That situation is as follows. There are two boxes. One box is opaque. The 
other box is transparent and contains $1000. You have two options: 
 
 (O1) Take only the opaque box (‘one-boxing’) 
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 Nozick 1969: 207-8. 
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 (O2) Take the opaque box and the transparent box (‘two-boxing’) 
 
You keep what is in the box(es) that you take. Yesterday the being predicted 
what you will now do. If (S1) it predicted that you one-box then it left $1M in the 
opaque box. If (S2) it predicted that you two-box then it left nothing there. 
 We may summarize the situation by means of a familiar sort of matrix: 
 
 S1: being predicts O1 S2: being predicts O2 
O1: take one box M 0 
O2: take both boxes M + K K 
 Table 1: payoffs in Newcomb’s problem 
 
(I write M for one million, K for one thousand, and assume as is harmless if 
unrealistic that you have linear utility for dollars.) Should you one-box or should 
you two-box? 
 This problem (Newcomb’s problem) is a well-known crux in normative 
decision theory. It sets at odds two theories of rational decision that agree in 
many cases, namely Causal Decision Theory and Evidential Decision Theory. 
Causal Decision Theory says, roughly speaking, that one should always act so 
as to cause, or to maximize the probability of causing, outcomes that one wants.2 
Evidential Decision Theory says that one should always act in such a way that 
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 Lewis 1981 and Joyce 1999 are standard presentations. 
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one acts are the strongest evidence of the outcomes that one wants.3 These 
theories will conflict when one’s acts are evidentially but not causally relevant to 
states of interest, as is the case in Newcomb’s problem: whether you take one 
box or two boxes is evidentially but not causally relevant to what the being 
predicted, and hence also to whether or not there is already $1M in the opaque 
box.  
 As this brief outline might have led you to expect, standard Causal 
Decision Theory recommends two-boxing in Newcomb’s problem and standard 
Evidential Decision Theory recommends one-boxing. A third approach seeks to 
reconcile the two theories: according to it, when we understand what is really 
involved in calculating the relevant probabilities from the agent’s own 
perspective, we see that the problem is somehow misdescribed, and that a 
proper description of the case generates no real conflict between these decision-
theoretic principles.4  
 This paper is not concerned to take sides on the right answer to 
Newcomb’s paradox. Rather it is about our intuitions concerning Newcomb’s 
paradox. In particular, it concerns a troubling discontinuity that arises when we 
consider our intuitive reactions across the continuum of versions of the puzzle 
that arises as we vary the predictor’s competence.  
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 Jeffrey 1965 is a standard presentation. (The second edition of this book, Jeffrey 1983, 
amended Evidential Decision Theory precisely in order to accommodate two-boxing in the 
Newcomb Problem.)  
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 For a view of this kind, see Meek and Glymour 1994.  
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2. Many people find two-boxing intuitively attractive. The predictor has already 
left something or nothing in the opaque box. Nothing that you do will affect that. 
Since it will make you $1K richer in either case, you might as well two-box. This 
is the ‘dominance’ argument for O2.
5  
But its conclusion becomes less attractive if we suppose that the predictor 
is definitely right. Filling this in: not only does it have a 100% track record of 
predicting your choices, and anyone else’s choices, in the many situations of this 
type in which he has been involved; but you are for this reason entirely certain 
that he knows what you are about to do. You are as certain of this as you are that 
2 + 2 = 4, or that you or your thoughts exist, or that there is something and not 
nothing.6 So you are this certain that you will get the $1M if and only if one-box. 
Call this the assumption of an infallible predictor.7 Given an infallible predictor, 
many people prefer to one-box.  
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 Proponents of this argument, and of the Causal Decision Theory underlying it, include Nozick 
(1969: 219-26), Gibbard and Harper (1978:  361), Skyrms (1980: 128-30), Lewis (1981: 309), 
Joyce (1999: 150-1), Weirich (1998: 116-7; 2001: 126) and Sloman (2005: 90). Egan (2007: 94-6) 
and Wedgwood (2013: 2647) both endorse O2 in Newcomb’s problem but reject Causal Decision 
Theory for other reasons.   
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 For the sake of clarity: when I say that the predictor is infallible, or that it is definitely right, or 
that you are entirely certain that it is right, I mean that you have Cr (S1  O1) = 1, where Cr is 
your subjective credence function (i.e. it is a probability function taking maximal value here). 
Similarly when I discuss ‘Certainty Effect’ in s. 4, I intend it to apply to cases in which we are 
explicitly told that the predictor is infallible, certainly correct etc. in the sense just outlined. 
7
 Be careful to distinguish what I am here calling infallibility (that the predictor is certainly in fact 
correct) from necessary infallibility (that the predictor is necessarily correct). We are given in the 
story that the prediction was made yesterday, and the point of this is supposed to be that the 
prediction was causally independent of your present choice. (At least this is so if we put aside 
Price’s worry (2012: 510ff.) that this makes the story inconsistent.) It follows that the predictor is 
at best contingently correct; for if he is in fact correct, then had you chosen otherwise he would 
have been incorrect. (At least this is so on some non-‘backtracking’ interpretation of that 
counterfactual: see Lewis 1979: 33-5; cf. Horgan 1981: 162-5.) Hence he might easily have been 
wrong even if he is certainly in fact correct. One unfortunate complication of the literature is that 
although my usage is prevalent, some writers (e.g. Fischer (1994)) use ‘infallible’ to mean 
necessary correctness. 
 Two further points on ‘infallible’: first, the distinction between necessary correctnesss and 
actual correctenss is quite different from the distinction between the normative and the descriptive 
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This paper considers a package combining these responses. According to 
it, what you should do depends on your confidence that the predictor is right. If 
you are highly confident but not 100% confident that the predictor is right, you 
should two-box. But if you are completely confident of this, then you should one-
box. Call this the Discontinuous Strategy (DS), it being discontinuous in the 
obvious sense that the number of boxes it recommends you take is a 
discontinuous function of your confidence in the predictor. The discontinuity is at 
the only plausible place in its neighbourhood that it could be.8 It would be odd 
and clearly unmotivated suddenly to switch from two-boxing to one-boxing when 
your confidence in the predictor’s being correct reaches 90%, or 95%, or 
98.21653%. But for some reason it looks reasonable to switch at 100%.  
What attraction the DS has is not dependent on the precise amounts of 
money involved, or on the fact that the prizes are monetary. But it does depend 
in part on the following: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
in decision theory. Newcomb’s problem is a normative problem; but to say that the predictor is 
‘actually correct’ is not to treat it as a descriptive one. The correctness of the predictor consists 
solely in the truth of its prediction and can be treated as exogenous in this problem. Newcomb’s 
problem is a problem of rational choice only for the person facing the boxes, not for the predictor. 
To describe the predictor as certainly in fact correct is not to misapply descriptive decision theory 
but only to specify further what this normative problem involves.  
 Second, one might question even whether a predictor who is infallible is possible. For 
instance, Ledwig and Spohn have both argued that for any predictor, one can always imagine a 
possible world in which that predictor predicts incorrectly (Ledwig 2000: 172). At least in the 
modal system S5 it follows, and I agree, that a necessarily correct predictor is impossible. But this 
is consistent with the predictor’s being infallible in the more restricted sense intended here, 
namely: that the agent has credence 1 that the predictor is actually if contingently correct on this 
occasion.       
8
 The point of ‘in its neighbourhood’ is to focus attention away from a discontinuity to which 
Evidential Decision Theory is independently committed. EDT endorses two-boxing if your 
confidence that the predictor is correct (i.e. your Cr (S1O1) = Cr (S2O2)) is less than n0 =def. (M + 
K) / 2M. But as soon as your confidence rises beyond that level, which is approximately 0.5, it 
abruptly switches to one-boxing. This discontinuity is both defensible and irrelevant.  
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(1) Certainty Principle (CP): Given options O1 and O2, if you are 
certain that either O1  Z1, or O2  Z2, where Z1 and Z2 are 
incompatible ‘prizes’ or outcomes, and if you prefer Z1 to Z2, then 
O1 is rationally superior to O2. 
 
Let O1 and O2 be as in Table 1. Let Z1 and Z2 be the outcomes that you get $1M 
and $1K respectively. Then the CP applies given an infallible predictor. And it 
recommends one-boxing. But it does not apply to cases where the predictor is 
even slightly fallible. So it looks compatible with two-boxing there.  
So we may represent the DS as arising from two principles: standard 
dominance reasoning if the predictor is fallible, and the Certainty Principle if not. 
Certainly some writers have endorsed or expressed sympathy for the DS on 
these grounds9. Others have at least acknowledged the intuitive pull of the 
argument.10 On the other hand, the position seems absurdly capricious. 
 
[D]oes a proponent of taking what is in both boxes [given fallibility] (e.g., 
me) really wish to argue that it is the probability, however minute, of the 
predictor’s being mistaken that makes all the difference? Does he really 
                                                        
9
 E.g. Leeds (1984: 106), Clark (2007: 143-4), Hubin and Ross (1985: 439). Bach (1987: 416) 
claims that most proponents of two-boxing against fallible predictors back off from this policy 
against infallible predictors. Leslie (1991: 73-4) says something similar, although he himself is a 
thoroughgoing one-boxer. More forthrightly, Levi (1975) writes that in Newcomb’s problem as 
(under)-described above, you typically do not know what probabilities to apply, and so should 
follow a strategy like ‘maximin’ (which recommends two-boxing). But if you know that the 
predictor is in fact perfectly accurate then you should one-box.   
10
 E.g. Nozick (1969: 232; but see immediately below in the main text), Gibbard and Harper 
(1978: 370) and Seidenfeld (1984: 203). Horgan grounds the present application of the CP in 
premises about what the agent has or has not the power to do (1985: 230-1). Sobel (1988: 109-
11) criticizes this for misusing the word ‘power’. But one might take the CP to support the DS 
quite independently of that semantic question.      
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wish to argue that if he knows the prediction will be correct, he will take 
only the [opaque box], but that if he knows someone using the predictor’s 
theory will be wrong once in every 20 billion cases, he will take what is in 
both boxes? Could the difference between one in n, and none in n, for 
arbitrarily large finite n, make this difference? And how exactly does the 
fact that the predictor is certain to have been correct dissolve the force of 
the dominance argument?11 
 
This raises two questions. 
(A) Could the Discontinuous Strategy be rational? More generally, could 
one reasonably apply the CP to cases of infallible predictors and the like whilst 
accepting ordinary dominance reasoning in ‘fallible’ versions of Newcomb’s 
problem? 
(B) If not then why is it attractive? If the difference ‘between one in n, and 
none in n, for arbitrarily large finite n’ does not in fact make any difference to 
what is rational, then why does it seem that way? What accounts for the pull of 
one-boxing under infallibility, which as documented many philosophers (and 
doubtless many non-philosophers) have felt, but nobody seems able to 
explain?12 
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 Nozick 1969: 232. 
12
 Two possible explanations of this have been suggested to me, namely (1) that people consider 
a probability of 1 as a qualitative difference whereas in fact it is only a quantitative one; (2) that 
people think that the Sorites paradox gets it all wrong that if one removes one grain of sand each 
time from a heap of 10,000,000 grains of sand, in the end one still does have a heap, because 
one grain of sand shouldn't make a difference. I think that (1) is not very far from my own story in 
s. 4: what I am adding is a more detailed account of how the difference ‘between one in n and 
none in n’ is ‘qualitative’ i.e. that it induces a discontinuity. As for (2): perhaps it is true that the 
best answer to the Sorites paradox is that one grain can make all the difference; but that leaves 
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3. The DS is irrational. To see why, suppose you accept it because you accept 
the CP. Now consider this variant of Newcomb’s problem.  
 
Two-Predictor Problem (2PP): As before, you are facing two boxes, one 
opaque and one transparent. As before, you can take, and keep what is 
in, either the opaque box only, or that box and the transparent box. As 
before, the transparent box contains $1K. And as before, a predictor 
determined the contents of the opaque box in the usual manner. 
But this time the predictor has been drawn by a weighted lottery 
from a pool of two predictors, the draw itself being both causally and 
stochastically independent of your choice. These predictors, Chas and 
Dave, are of wildly varying competence. Chas always makes a correct 
prediction. So you are certain that this is what happened if he is in charge 
on this occasion. Dave always gets it wrong. Whenever he is in charge, it 
is always and only the two-boxers that end up millionaires. So your 
payoffs are certainly in fact as follows: 
 
 C: Chas predicts D: Dave predicts 
O1: you take one box M 0 
O2: you take both  K M + K 
                                                                                                                                                                     
open something that the present treatment tries to answer, namely why in the present problem it 
should always be this grain of sand, i.e. the very last one, that seems decisive. (Thanks to a 
referee.)     
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Table 2: Two-Predictor Problem 
 
The lottery that determined the predictor was weighted towards Chas at a 
rate of n: 1-n (0 < n < 1). So you have confidence of n that on this 
occasion Chas was running the show. Should you one-box or two-box?  
 
Note that although you are not certain who is doing the predicting, the CP still 
applies. To see this, define Z1 (n) and Z2 (n) as follows: 
 
 Z1 (n): You get a free lottery ticket that pays out $1M with probability n.  
 
Z2 (n): You get a free lottery ticket that pays out $1M with probability 1-n, 
plus a $1K bonus. 
 
If you choose O1 then certainly you will get: $1M if Chas was picked on this 
occasion and nothing if Dave was picked. This is certainly equivalent to the 
lottery ticket that Z1 (n) describes. Similarly, you are certain that if you choose O2 
then you will get: $1K if Chas was picked and $(1M + 1K) if Dave was picked. 
This is certainly equivalent to the lottery-ticket-plus-bonus Z2 (n).  
So in 2PP you are already certain that either you will choose O1 and get Z1 
(n) or you will choose O2 and get Z2 (n). It follows from the CP that you should 
choose O1 over O2 if you prefer the first prize to the second: 
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(2) In 2PP you should choose O1 over O2 if Z1 (n)  Z2 (n). 
 
Now clearly for any large enough n < 1 it is true that Z1 (n)  Z2 (n) i.e. that 
you, and anyone else who prefers more money to less, would prefer a ticket for a 
$1M lottery at odds of n: 1-n to a $1K bonus plus a ticket for that lottery at the 
opposite odds i.e. at odds of 1-n: n. After all, would you really exchange (i) this 
$1M in gilt-edged securities for (ii) $1K plus a ticket for a real national lottery, with 
a 1-in-a-million chance of winning? You would rather keep (i).13 But (i) is just a 
lottery ticket with a very good chance of winning $1M, since there is a 1-in-a-
million chance that the issuer will go bust tomorrow. 
 It follows from this fact and (2) that the CP recommends one-boxing in the 
two-predictor case for some n strictly less than one. Let n* < 1 be some such n. 
In other words, if Cr is your subjective credence function, then the CP 
recommends O1 in 2PP if Cr (C) = n*. 
 Holding on to the supposition that you follow the DS on the basis of the 
CP, consider now a standard Newcomb scenario with one fallible predictor. In 
particular its strike rate, so also your confidence that it is correct on this occasion, 
is the quantity n* from the previous example. Here you prefer ex hypothesi to 
two-box, because the DS recommends two-boxing against fallible predictors.  
                                                        
13
 Obviously this is not so much an argument as an appeal to the reader’s intuition. But it is 
possible to argue that for any risk averse subject who falls short of being infinitely risk averse, it is 
possible to choose an n < 1 such that the subject prefers (i) to (ii). For instance, suppose the 
subject to have a standard utility function for dollars U (z) = -e
-Rz
, R > 0 being the Arrow-Pratt 
coefficient of risk aversion. Then she prefers (i) to (ii) just in case n(1 – e
-RM
)(1 + e
-RK
) > 1 – e
-R(M + 
K)
. This inequality always has a solution n < 1 for R < .  
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 But this is inconsistent, for this standard scenario, and the ‘variant’ 
involving Chas and Dave, are in fact one scenario described in two ways. The 
one predictor in the standard scenario is a person, Chas’n’Dave, who like all 
persons is an aggregate of momentary person-stages, some of which make 
predictions. The stages of this latter sort are themselves distributed across two 
temporally scattered objects. One of these, Chas, is the aggregate of those of 
Chas’n’Dave’s temporal stages, past present and future, that make true 
predictions (i.e. predictions that are in fact fulfilled), these forming a proportion Cr 
(C) = n* of the stages of Chas’n’Dave that make any prediction at all. The other 
object, Dave, aggregates those temporal stages that make false predictions, 
these forming the remaining proportion 1-n* of the stages of Chas’n’Dave that 
make any prediction at all.14  
It was Chas’n’Dave himself, who gets it right n* times for every 1-n* times 
that he gets it wrong, who determined what is in the opaque box facing you now. 
To say that is to say that you are facing a gamble, at odds of n*: 1-n*, that an 
infallible predictor rather than a hopeless one determined the contents of that 
box.  
It follows that the Certainty Principle itself, which was supposed to help 
motivate the Discontinuous Strategy, actually conflicts with it. For the CP implies 
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 It is true that in the situation that I described Chas and Dave are probably not distinct persons, 
although they may be, if (a) the Chas-stages are psychologically continuous with one another; 
and (b) so are the Dave-stages; but (c) the Chas-stages are not psychologically continuous with 
the Dave-stages. Certainly they are not temporally continuous persons. But nothing in 
Newcomb’s problem, or in anyone’s intuitions regarding it, or in any significant arguments 
concerning it, depends on the predictor’s counting even as a person, let alone a temporally 
continuous one. If it could be the market (Broome 1989), an alien being (Nozick 1969: 207) or 
even God (Craig 1987, Resnik 1987: 111), then why couldn’t it be a temporally scattered sub-
personal aggregate of person-stages?   
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that when facing a fallible predictor in Newcomb’s Problem you should one-box if 
your confidence that he has got it right exceeds n* < 1. This is straightforwardly 
inconsistent with the discontinuous strategy of one-boxing if and only if you are 
certain that the predictor is correct.  
This leaves two options. First, you might reject the Certainty Principle. 
Then the DS loses all motivation. In particular, nobody who felt sympathy for the 
two-boxing strategy against a fallible predictor has any further reason to doubt it 
when the predictor is known or certain to be right. The upshot is that you endorse 
two-boxing whether or not the predictor is infallible. 
Second, you might accept the CP, and in particular that it applies, via (2), 
in favour of one-boxing even against a fallible predictor. In fact it supports one-
boxing over two-boxing just in case your confidence in the predictor exceeds 
some n such that you would pay $1K to exchange a 1-n: n chance of winning 
$1M for an n: 1-n chance of winning $1M. On a natural assumption, your strategy 
is then indistinguishable from a purely evidentialist approach to the Newcomb 
problem.15 But either way, the DS itself has got to go.    
 
4. So why did it look so good? What difference between infallibility and near-
infallibility could explain whatever additional attraction one-boxing exerts upon 
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 This is Evidential Decision Theory or EDT, as defended in its pure form in Jeffrey 1965. The 
‘natural assumption’ is that your value for a lottery is its expected value. In that case and in 
Jeffrey’s terminology, the CP demands one boxing just in case nV(M) > (1-n)V(M + K) + nV(K) i.e. 
iff Cr (S1O1) V (M) > Cr (S1O2) V (M + K) + Cr (S2O2) V (K) i.e. iff EDT demands it. (Here I am 
writing V (X) for your news value for the proposition that you get $X and setting V (0) = 0.) In 
particular, if we assume that V (You get $X) = X then the CP demands one-boxing iff nM > (1-
n)(M + K) + nK i.e. iff n > (M + K) / 2M = n0, as defined at n. 8.   
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us, at least upon persons who are otherwise two-boxers, when the predictor is 
certainly correct?   
 Let me first mention two possible explanations that seem to me not to 
work. First: Although this is not the main message of Hubin and Ross 1985, that 
paper suggests that the DS turns on a failure to distinguish between (i) 
Supposing that the predictor is correct and then comparing what would happen if 
you were to one-box with what would happen if you were to two-box, and (ii) 
Comparing what would happen if you were to one-box against a correct predictor 
with what would happen if you were to two-box against a correct predictor. The 
idea is that if we attend to (i) as Causal Decision Theory says we should, then 
two-boxing always comes out better by $1K. But if we attend to (ii), then one-
boxing can seem to do better than two-boxing by $1M to $1K. And the appeal of 
the DS arises from the fact that we mistakenly attend to (ii) when considering the 
perfect predictor case and so conclude that one-boxing is optimal there.  
But this appears simply to shift the question: why, we want to ask, doesn’t 
a similar confusion have a similar effect when the predictor is imperfect but still 
very good? And in any case, it isn’t necessary to formulate the dominance 
argument in these counterfactual terms: all that is necessary to make it seem 
compelling is that (a) the content of the prediction is causally independent of your 
choice, and (b) two-boxing does better than one-boxing on either hypothesis 
about that content. This reasoning is not open to any such counterfactual fallacy 
as the confusion of (i) and (ii). But it too suffers a peculiar loss of force on the 
hypothesis of an infallible predictor. 
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Another possible explanation is that when we are certain that the predictor 
is infallible, we take the choice to exert a retrocausal effect on the prediction. In 
that case, the dominance argument fails to apply, since what you now do has an 
effect on the prediction. But it is implausible to suppose, as this explanation does, 
that an event has causal influence on whatever it makes certain. For instance, 
you might quite sensibly be completely certain that if this projectile escapes the 
Earth’s gravitational pull then it was released at a speed exceeding 11km/s. But 
nobody thinks that the escape caused the release. 
Let me turn to my own view. I suggest that the DS manifests an illusion of 
reason in which there is already good reason to believe. This is Certainty Effect: 
a fixed reduction of the probability of an outcome has more impact when the 
outcome was initially certain than when it was initially probable. 
The following two problems illustrate the effect. ‘Each problem was 
presented to a different group of respondents. Each group was told that one 
participant in ten, preselected at random, would actually be playing for money. 
Chance events were realized, in the respondents’ presence, by drawing a single 
ball from a bag containing a known proportion of balls of the winning color, and 
the winners were paid immediately.  
 
Problem 1 [N = 77]: Which of the following options do you prefer?  
1A. A sure win of $30 [78 percent]  
1B. An 80% chance to win $45 [22 percent]  
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Problem 2 [N = 81]: Which of the following options do you prefer?  
2A. A 25% chance to win $30 [42 percent]  
2B. A 20% chance to win $45 [58 percent].’ 
 
The proportion of each group choosing each option is indicated in square 
brackets after that option.16 
 Looking at these data, what springs out is that whereas 1A is much more 
popular than 1B, 2A is slightly less popular than 2B. This suggests that many 
people prefer 1A to 1B and 2B to 2A. That is inconsistent. Consider: 
 
Problem 3: Tomorrow one out of you and three others will be chosen at 
random to face Problem 1. But you must decide today what option to take 
if you happen to get picked. Which of the following options do you prefer? 
3A. If you are picked to face Problem 1 take option 1A. 
3B. If you are picked to face Problem 1 take option 1B. 
 
Anyone who chooses 1A in Problem 1 should prefer 3A to 3B in Problem 3. If 1A 
is right today then it is right tomorrow, assuming as we may that nothing about 
the problem has changed in the meantime. And if 1A is right in Problem 1 then it 
is right in Problem 1 whether or not you do in fact face it. That it is 3 to 1 that you 
won’t face it does nothing to change the rationality of taking 1A if you face it. 
 But anyone who chooses 2B in Problem 2 should prefer 3B to 3A in 
problem 3. For Problem 3 is a realization of Problem 2: choosing option 3A in 
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 Kahneman and Tversky 1981: 30 with trivial alterations. 
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Problem 3 gives you a 25% chance of winning $30 and choosing option 3B gives 
you a 20% chance of winning $45. (We can assume that in Problem 3, as in 
Problems 1 and 2, real money is involved in 10% of all cases.)  
 So anyone who chooses 1A in Problem 1 and 2B in Problem 2 is 
practically irrational in a way that would show up in Problem 3. The data suggest 
that probably there are many such people. 
 The explanation for this lapse of rationality is ‘Certainty Effect’, a 
phenomenon that Allais pointed out in his 1953 paper and which has since been 
well documented in humans and animals17. To repeat: it is that a fixed reduction 
of the probability of an outcome has more impact when the outcome was initially 
certain than when it was initially probable.  
It is easy to see this effect at work in the data. As we move from Problem 
1 to Problem 2, the probability of getting $30 under the ‘A’ option in each problem 
falls by the same factor as the probability of getting $45 under the corresponding 
‘B’ option (both fall by three-quarters). But this has a greater negative impact on 
the attractiveness of the ‘A’ option than on that of the ‘B’ option. On the present 
view of things, the ‘A’ option is then being rationally underweighted relative to the 
‘B’ option. Certainty Effect is a widespread form of practical irrationality. 
 Let us apply it to explain the attractiveness of the DS.18 What makes the 
Newcomb Problem troublesome is that two intuitive motivations that normally 
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 E.g. Shafir et al. 2008. 
18
 An obvious problem with this strategy is that it seems illegitimately to confuse descriptive with 
normative approaches to decision theory. Certainty Effect is a matter of descriptive psychology 
(this is something that people actually do) whereas Newcomb’s Problem is a problem in the 
normative theory: should you one-box or two-box? It is true that this paper uses both normative 
and descriptive arguments, but it segregates their applications. The purely normative argument of 
s. 3 is directed at question (A) and aims to establish the normative conclusion that you should not 
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work together are here in conflict. These motivations are (i) facts about stochastic 
correlations as reflected in your conditional credences (ii) facts about causal 
dependencies as reflected in your causal or counterfactual beliefs. We may rank 
options according to their tendency to bear good news, which depends on (i); or 
according to their causal efficacy, which depends on (ii). Of course in most 
everyday situations, but not in the Newcomb problem, these rankings coincide.19  
 I suggest that what drives each person’s intuition about Newcomb cases 
of either type (those involving a fallible predictor v. those involving an infallible 
predictor) is some weighted combination of these motivations. Persons in whom 
(i) always predominates are intuitive evidentialists about decision theory (e.g. as 
it happens, me20). Persons in whom (ii) always predominates are intuitive 
causalists about decision theory (e.g. Lewis and Joyce). For this reason I’ll call (i) 
the E-motive and (ii) the C-motive. Probably both motives carry some weight for 
                                                                                                                                                                     
find the DS attractive. The descriptive argument of s. 4 is directed at question (B) and aims to 
explain why people do in fact (and contrary to this advice) find it attractive.  
19
 Whilst I am here following the standard presentation of Newcomb’s problem (as in, e.g., Joyce 
1999: 146-54), some philosophers have gone deeper, claiming that the alleged opposition 
between causal and evidential approaches can be overcome given either (i) a clearer sense of 
the internal evidence available to the deliberator (Eells 1982: ch. 7-8) or (ii) a proper 
understanding of causation and its role in the problem (for different elaborations of which see 
Price 2012 s. 8 and Spohn 2012). I cannot enter into the matter here, but very briefly: Ad (i): there 
are in my view (fallibilistic) versions of the Newcomb paradox to which Eells’s ‘tickle’-style 
defence does not apply (see my forthcoming, s. 4.6). And ad (ii): I am generally pessimistic about 
the prospects for an irenic resolution of the dispute along Pricean lines, for reasons given in my 
forthcoming, ch. 8. But I should add that Spohn’s recent work probably represents the most 
serious challenge to the standard picture assumed here. I hope to address this in future work.  
20
 So I accept the Certainty Principle and endorse one-boxing in the Newcomb Problem exactly 
where Evidential Decision Theory does. I cannot argue for this position here (but see my 
forthcoming, ss. 7.3-4). On the other hand, you needn’t agree with me on this point to accept my 
main argument, which does not rely on the truth of the Certainty Principle but only on its 
inconsistency with the DS. The position of this paper is that since the DS is inconsistent with its 
own sole motivation, namely the CP, it cannot be rational to accept the DS, whatever you think 
about the CP. (Thanks to a referee.) 
 18 
most people; certainly this will be true for anyone to whom the DS seems 
attractive.21 The following explanation then applies to those people.  
 Notice that Certainty Effect predicts an abrupt variation in the strength of 
the E-motive as we move from the case where the predictor is infallible to the 
case where he is (merely) very accurate. In particular consider these three cases 
(in (b) and (c) we take N to be the same very large quantity):  
 
(a) Newcomb’s Problem with an infallible predictor 
 
(b) Newcomb’s Problem but the predictor has a strike rate of (N-1) / N  
 
(c) Newcomb’s Problem but the predictor has a strike rate of (N-2) / N 
 
The C-motive to two-box remains equally strong in all cases. In (a) the E-motive 
to one-box is maximally strong: here the conditional probability of being a 
millionaire given that you one-box is 1. In (b) that conditional probability has 
fallen to (N-1) / N and in (c) it has fallen further, to (N-2) / N.  
Certainty Effect predicts that the move from (a) to (b) has more negative 
impact on the strength of the E-motive than the move from (b) to (c).22 
                                                        
21
 So I am here supposing that most of us do in fact respond to a probabilistically weighted 
combination of decision-theoretic motivations in something like the manner recommended in 
Nozick 1993 Part II. It is a nice question whether people should rationally have such a mixed 
response to these mixed motives. Fortunately, I can set aside that task the purely descriptive 
purposes of this section. (For more on the division of descriptive/normative labour in this paper, 
see n. 18 above.)  
22
 It might concern you that I am not comparing like with like: in the move from option 1A to option 
2A the associated chance fell by the same multiplicative factor as in the move from option 1B to 
option 2B. But in the move from case (a) to case (b) the associated probability fell by the same 
 19 
Equivalently, the move from (b) to (a) has more positive impact on the E-motive 
than what ought rationally to be the equally significant move from (c) to (b). So if 
Certainty Effect is strong enough then you would expect the E-motive to jump 
discontinuously in strength between (b) and (a), and so be strong enough to 
outweigh the C-motive in (a) but not in (b). And that, finally, might account for the 
intuitive appeal of the DS—which, as I have already argued, is inconsistent with 
the only principle (the CP) that even looks like supporting it.23  
So my answers to (A) and (B) are as follows. (A) The Discontinuity 
Strategy, which recommends one-boxing if and only if the predictor is infallible, is 
irrational. (B) It is attractive because of Certainty Effect, in particular the irrational 
overweighting of certain intuitions given an infallible predictor. If (B) is true then 
our intuitions regarding infallible predictors are less trustworthy than those 
directed at ‘fallible’ Newcomb cases. For this reason, future discussion of the 
Newcomb problem should focus exclusively on those less tidy versions in which 
the predictor is known to be highly reliable but never assumed to be perfect.24 
                                                                                                                                                                     
additive increment as in the move from (b) to (c). But if N is large then this difference is 
insignificant, since in that case ((N-1) / N)
2
  (N-2) / N, and so the factor by which the predictor’s 
strike rate in (b) exceeds that in (c) is roughly equal to the factor by which the strike rate in (a) 
(=1)  exceeds that in (b). 
23
 I should here explicitly acknowledge what will anyway be obvious, that the psychological 
source of this intuitive illusion is really an empirical matter that could only be decisively settled by 
experiment. But this section was written entirely from an armchair. Let me give two excuses for 
that. First: to my knowledge nobody has ever posited, let alone tested, any explanation of why the 
DS is intuitively plausible. So even from the armchair it is possible to advance matters by positing 
one. Second: there is in the nature of infallible Newcomb cases some difficulty in testing the 
relative strength of E-motives and C-motives. It may be hard to get anyone to believe that 
somebody else is a very accurate predictor of her choice. How could you ever convince someone 
that the predictor is infallible? Perhaps this explains the dearth of even aspirationally rigorous 
studies of intuition in this special case (Anand 1990 being the only one known to me). In any case 
it makes it plausible that the present enquiry is best pursued, because only pursuable, from the 
armchair.    
24
 Of course, the paradoxical nature of the Newcomb Problem is clearly visible even in the 
‘imperfect’ versions. But the pull of evidentialist arguments is much clearer in the ‘perfect’ cases. 
Notwithstanding my own sympathies for evidentialism, I must therefore eschew the use of the 
 20 
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